

Between Myself and Others: Towards a Phenomenology of the Experience of Love

Introduction: Two Cultural Traditions of Love

Philosophical reflection on love has always been a Western pre-occupation. Greek mythology began with *Chaos* and *Eros*. Hesiod's conception of *eros* as a violent and powerful sexual drive became the archaic meaning of love from the ancient to our modern times.¹ This meaning was further incorporated in another important goddess, *Aphrodite*.² Together with *Aphrodite*'s three children, *Daimos* (terror), *Phobus* (fear), and *Harmonia* (harmony), and with *Eros*'s two companions, *Pathos* (longing) and *Himeros* (desire), *Eros* and *Aphrodite* are the two most powerful and complicated symbolic images of love, which have determined the Western mind for the last two thousand years.³ Love is beauty, desire, happiness and harmony, but it also brings fear, terror and suffering. When the Greek *mythos* gradually gave way to *logos*, Empedocles interpreted *philia* as one of the two cosmic forces that bind and separate all things in birth and destruction.⁴ Both mythological and cosmological meanings of *eros* and *philia* prepared the way for Plato's groundbreaking understanding of the nature of love as found in his dialogues, *Lysis*, *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. All subsequent philosophical discussion on love must therefore begin with Plato.⁵ Indeed the

¹ "[...] and Love, most beautiful of all the deathless gods. He makes men weak, the spirit in the breasts of men and gods." Hesiod, *Theogony*, trans. Dorothea Wender, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973, p. 27.

² The birth of *Aphrodite* from the genital of *Ouranos* castrated by *Kronos* adds to the violent and sexual connotation associated with love. See *ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

³ See Martin S. Bergmann, *The Anatomy of Loving*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 21-34.

⁴ See Empedocles, Fragment 17. *Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, trans. Kathleen Freeman, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962, p. 53.

⁵ "In the philosophy of love, however, I am convinced that every discussion must start with Plato." Thus begins the seminal works on love by Irving Singer. *The Nature of Love*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 47.

very conception of Western philosophy as *philia-sophia*, love of wisdom, is originated in this Platonic tradition. The pursuit of truth, beauty and good embodies the ideal meaning of love. Western philosophy begins with love.

It is generally agreed that love in the Western philosophical tradition means at least four things: *eros*, *philia*, *agape* and romantic love.⁶ *Eros* is normally translated as desire, sexual love or simply love; *philia* as friendship; *agape* as the love of God and romantic love as the passionate and sexual love which originated in 11th-century southern Europe. Among the four meanings, *eros* is the most profound because of its history is longer than that of the other three. *Eros* is also more fundamental, because *philia* can be seen as a derivative of *eros*. The idea of *agape* appeared only later in the Greek philosophical tradition with the introduction of Christianity. Romantic love, on the other hand, is the reversal of the Platonic idealistic *eros* back to the passionate individualistic sexual union. This kind of love can even be interpreted as a vulgarization of Platonic ideals.⁷

However, this *eros-philia-agape* schema of the Western tradition is totally foreign to Chinese culture. There is a complete absence of any god of love or sex in Chinese mythology, and in fact no Chinese philosopher has ever thematized love in any philosophical treaties. Since Confucianism, the vigor and passion of love has been tamed into the humanistic idea of *ren* (仁). Indeed there is even a lack of semiotic equivalence of a Chinese term for love. Of course it does not mean that “love” plays no role in Chinese culture. On the contrary, love, or better “*qing*” (情) is the essence of all Chinese literary works beginning with the *Book of Songs* (《詩經》) more than two thousand years ago.⁸ The *telos* of classical Chinese thought does not aim at the search for truth but a transformation of the person into a virtuous human being. In Chinese philosophy, the term “love” only appeared in the early 20th century and differs considerably from the Western idea.

It is against this background that I wish to discuss a question: Can there be a phenomenology of love without paying tribute to the philosophical tradition of the two great cultures? Or given the entirely

⁶ See Alan Soble, ed. *Eros, Agape and Philia: Readings in the Philosophy of Love*, New York: Paragon House, 1989.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁸ For an introductory discussion on this problem see the preceding chapter, “Western Love, Chinese *Qing*.”

different hermeneutic horizons of *eros-philia-agape* in the West and *qing* in Chinese culture, can a phenomenology of love be meaningful to us today in a globalized world? But before any phenomenology is possible, we have to secure the phenomenon first. *Die Sache selbst* is “love.” How can “love” be grasped as a phenomenon? What is the experience of love? How is love experienced?

The Phenomenon of Love

“Has love no other term than a person?” Levinas asks this question in the later part of *Totality and Infinity*. He continues, “The person here enjoys a privilege—the loving intention goes unto the Other, unto the friend, the child, the brother, the beloved, the parents. But a thing, an abstraction, a book can likewise be objects of love.”⁹ Thus love is seen as that *something* between myself and the others. From my immanence there flows a loving intention to the transcendent exteriority of the others. I love my mother, my wife, my children and my friends, but at the same time I love photography, spicy food, philosophy, democracy and freedom. But what then is the meaning of love common to all these relations between myself and my dead mother, my dear wife, photography or philosophy? Surely they are all different objects of my “love.” If this is the case, then are there different kinds of love, or different forms of one love?

Love is one of the most puzzling enigmas. Philosophy has surely a priority in the elaboration of the meaning of love. Love seems to be the most common thing. It is the theme of a thousand films, songs and novels and of many academic and popular books. It has become a most merchandized commodity in the contemporary world. Surely we are all interested in “love” because we think love is essential to our life. Love would bring us joy, happiness and purpose of life. Love is held to be the answer for all human conflicts and suffering. But what is it that we all call love, that which appears in so many different and sometimes contradictory phenomena? Love is desire, commitment, passion, possession, jealousy, virtue and even madness. Love can be also classified as spiritual love, parental love, brotherly love, sexual love, self-love, etc. At the same time, love is distinguished into true and false love,

⁹ Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969, p. 254.

altruistic and selfish love, “pathological” and “practical” love.¹⁰ In short, love can be anything, eluding any precise definition. We are convinced that love is the most valued thing in life and the thirst for love is a quest for everyone. Love is everywhere, but also nowhere.¹¹ Like the question of time raised by Augustine, love is assumed to be understood by everybody while remaining most mysterious.

The enigma of love lies precisely in its indeterminacy: there is no necessary and sufficient reason for me to love or not to love anything. I have fond memories of my dead mother; I have duties towards my children; I have obligations to my country; I have found profound meaning in philosophy, and an exotic taste in spicy food. Nevertheless, no fond memories, duties, obligations, profound meanings or exotic tastes can force me to love. These values may be the consequences of my love, but not the causes of it. Or perhaps they have no relationship at all. There is no contradiction to say that I have moral obligations to my country but I do not love her. Nor is love something that can be given by others or received by myself such that I have “love” and therefore I must love this or that object. Neither any command, even one coming from God, nor any logical argument, ethical obligation, intrinsic beauty or goodness can force me to love the other. Love is a voluntary gift from myself to the other without any precondition or reason. The question is: Why do I love this one and not that one?

In light of the *eros-philía-agape* tradition, love is primarily interpreted from a metaphysical and ethical standpoint. What Plato expresses in the *Symposium* through Socrates and Diotima sets the ideal of love: only that which strives towards good, beauty and truth is qualified as love. According to this idealization of love, the loving relationships mentioned above belong to the lower levels of the ladder of love. True love is achieved through the striving of the soul from the particular and the transient towards the transcendental realm of the universal. The Aristotelian *philía* is a love of virtue. Only those who mutually act for the sake of virtue and the other’s welfare are true lovers. In the end only philosophers can be friends. All other relationships are based on either

¹⁰ Kant distinguishes two aspect of love. One is based on one’s sentiment, hence “pathological.” The other is grounded in reason, therefore it is “practical.” See Immanuel Kant, *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Herbert J. Paton, in *The Moral Law*, London: Hutchinson, 1976, p. 65.

¹¹ An interesting search from Google in 2004 showed that there were 222,000,000 (!) websites related to “love” and 3,390,000 results for “philosophy of love.”

pleasure or utility. The Christian *agape* is the unconditional love from God above. It is a command to love humanity based on faith. Only love in God's love can be truly called love. The dominant idea of love before the Middle Ages was intellectual, virtuous and religious love. Hence this *eros-philia-agape* schema is not a description of love as such but a prescriptive meaning against which all love is measured. It does not tell what love is but states what love ought to be. Love is therefore an ideal. Of course love is a desire that aims at the universal and the ultimate. In the *Symposium*, Plato concludes the meaning of love: "So if we were right in describing love as the desire always to possess the good, then the inevitable conclusion is that we desire immortality as well as goodness. On this argument, love must be desire for immortality as much as for beauty."¹² If we concede that this Platonic idea of love has been the determining factor of all subsequent discussions on love, then the Western philosophy of love is moral and metaphysical in essence. How should I love and what should be loved is thus defined. Surely it focuses on the object and finality of love rather than on love as a phenomenon.

But is there a distinction between what love is and what love ought to be? Can it be said that my "loving" relationships with my wife, my mother, philosophy, photography and spicy food are in fact not love at all? All these relationships can theoretically be reduced to certain feelings and emotions, such as respect, admiration, sexual desire and liking. If it is the case, then I do not love what I love unless I have identified the ideal of love in every case of my relationships. I do not know what I in fact mean when I say I love my wife or photography, unless I grasp the beauty or the good in them. But it is somewhat contrary to common sense to say that. Though I might not know how to elucidate the meaning of love I can nevertheless tell the difference between my love to my wife and to photography and the distinction between loving something and hating someone.

There are indeed many modern philosophies of love that offer explanations for the nature of love. C. S. Lewis's conception of love as "need-love and gift-love,"¹³ Robert Hazo's "acquisitive and benevolent desire"¹⁴ or, more recently, Rolf Johnson's "care-love, union-love and

¹² Plato, *Symposium*, 207a, trans. Tom Griffith, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

¹³ C. S. Lewis, *The Four Loves*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970.

¹⁴ Robert G. Hazo, *The Idea of Love*, New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1967.

appreciation-love”¹⁵ are such attempts. All different kinds of love are understood as certain human activities manifesting care, union or appreciation. Love is a need or a gift. Hence love manifests itself as value, virtue, care or gift. Love shows itself in parental love, in friendship, in romantic-sexual love and in the love of photography and even in my love for spicy food.

But such description of love is misleading because there is a tendency to think that “love” is a kind of substance which manifests itself in some human relationships. Between myself and the beloved objects, there is love. But, the being of love is in loving experience, i.e. my love for my mother is only meaningful if “loving my mother” is a lived experience (*Erlebnis*) for me. This love cannot be abstracted from the “I” who is loving my mother. Accordingly, the question of what love is appears as a metaphysically misplaced question, because love is not something substantive. In short, love is nothing. I do not have something called “love” but I am loving something. This loving as an irreducible, unique, in-between lived experience is the phenomenon of love. The “how” of love as experienced by myself is phenomenologically more primordial than the reason or cause of love.

Thus the primary task of a phenomenological understanding of love is to render this loving-lived-experience transparent. The *eros-philía-agape* schema must first be suspended in order to leave aside all metaphysical and ethical formulation. As a first descriptive meaning, I propose that loving-lived-experience can be shown as the intentional-affective-valuating-intuitive activity of myself to the beloved others while constituting an actual union with the others in myself and for myself.¹⁶

There are several moments in the particular experience of love. The most fundamental is the intentional structure of love. There must be the other beyond myself for me to love. Contrary to Platonic *eros*, which is desire for the ideal in the objects, my love is directed to a particular loved object. Love is not directed to value as such. As Scheler put it: “It is never values we love, but always something that

¹⁵ Rolf M. Johnson, *Three Faces of Love*, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001.

¹⁶ I have improvised the idea of “radical love” expounded by Jules Toner. Though he is not generally regarded as a phenomenologist, his insight into the experience of love is indeed phenomenological. See his *Love and Friendship*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2003.

possesses value.”¹⁷ Scheler is clearly right in stressing that the particular beloved object possessing value is more primordial than value itself. He nevertheless conceives love as “a movement pointing from a lower value to a higher one, though it is *not* necessary for *both* values to be given in the process.”¹⁸ Scheler places great emphasis on the human capacity to love. In *Ordo Amoris*, Scheler says: “Man, before he is an *ens cogitans* or *ens volans*, is an *ens amans*.”¹⁹ The ability of a human being to love discloses the world of value to him.

For Scheler, neither person nor love can be objectively described. Person, as the centrum of all intentional acts, is no substance, in *Man's Place in Nature*, Scheler writes: “Spirit is the only being incapable of becoming an object. It is pure actuality. It has being only in and through the execution of its acts. The center of spirit, the person, is not an object or a substantial kind of being, but a continuously self-executing, ordered structure of acts. The person is only in and through his act.”²⁰ Hence only a person can love because love is a spontaneous act which is directed towards value from the acting person. Yet love does not aim at value as such but the bearer of value. Scheler gives a formal definition of love: “Love is that movement wherein every concrete individual object that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature.”²¹ Value is not objectively given in the object, but through the openness of love as movement can love be disclosed. Moreover, love is the intentional act in which a higher value of the bearer is able to be realized. A. R. Luther explains Scheler's idea succinctly: “What the movement of love discovers is not the empirical given. Love is orientated to the factual only to the extent that the factual is the weight or density of the whole. Love is directed towards the whole as to what is present as unfinished, incomplete, open with respect to potentialities and possibilities [...]. Hence where love is concerned there is no object, there is nothing to be observed, looked at,

¹⁷ Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Peter Heath, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954, p. 148.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹⁹ Max Scheler, “*Ordo Amoris*,” in *Selected Philosophical Essays*, trans. David R. Lachterman, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 110-111.

²⁰ Max Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, trans. Hans Meyerhoff, Boston: Beacon Press, 1961, p. 36.

²¹ Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

etc. There is only a directed, orientated lived presence. Because there is no object present, love is a movement, a movement that is fundamentally unfinished, which coincides, as it were, with the unfinished lived directedness of the other in the direction of fulfillment! Whole, totality, higher value, value-image really mean fullness, and fullness means the other as source of what appears and is able to appear dynamically in the openness, movement, loving, who is a person.”²²

However, Scheler’s theory of love is more than a phenomenology of the experience of love. What he tries to demonstrate in *Ordo Amoris* is still Platonic in nature, and thus a metaphysics of *eros*. According to him, love is “the act that seeks to lead everything in the direction of the perfection of value proper to it [...]. Thus we define the essence of love as an edifying and uplifting action in and over the world.”²³ The ultimate goal of value is God. Therefore, metaphysically Scheler’s *Ordo Amoris* is the same as Diotima’s *ladder of love*. “Man’s love is restricted to recognizing the objective demand these objects make and to submitting to the gradation of rank in what is worthy of love.”²⁴ With this thesis, Scheler has left the loving-lived-experience behind.

Husserl also talks about love. In *Erste Philosophie*, Husserl relates love as the prime motive of philosophy, which strives for ultimate beauty. He says: “The beautiful is loved. The love, however, is without end. It is only love in the infinity of loving, and it thereby bears as correlate constantly within itself the infinity of the pure value itself.”²⁵ Husserl’s edification of love aims at those who take philosophy, *universalis sapientia*, as their vocation. This philosophical enterprise, however, only echoes once again the traditional Platonic ideal, which is beautifully described by Diotima in the *Symposium* as the ultimate end of philosophy.²⁶ As such, Husserl seems to take the Platonic *eros* for granted without further elaboration on the phenomenon of love.

Indeed all loving-lived-experiences involve valuating, i.e. either by recognizing values in the beloved objects or giving values to them. This is exactly the theory of love by Irving Singer, who in his three-

²² A. R. Luther, *Persons in Love*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 115.

²³ Max Scheler, *Ordo Amoris*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

²⁵ *Hua VIII*, S. 14. The English translation is by Marcus Brainard in his “Husserl on the Philosophical Vocation,” *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (1) 2001, p. 131.

²⁶ Cf. Plato, *Symposium*, 211 a-d.

volume work *The Nature of Love* tries to demonstrate the nature of love in the appraisal and bestowal of value.²⁷ Both Singer and Scheler place great emphasis on values. Yet if the *Ordo Amoris* has already set the hierarchy of values as the worthiness of love, then all true love has only one goal: we “must” love God.²⁸ From an intercultural perspective, such thesis is simply not true. Valuation is an essential moment of a loving-lived-experience. But there is no contradiction when I recognize that God is the important value cognitively, nevertheless I do not love him. There is no necessary causal connection between value and love, it is however true to say whenever I am loving something, I affirm value in that object. It does not matter whether the value is objectively real or subjectively ideal. This particular value in my particular beloved object is disclosed through my act of love. I do not love someone who is just beautiful in an objective and universal sense. I am loving a “beautiful” lady or object because through my loving act, the beauty of this particular lady or object is manifested in myself and for myself.

The loving-lived-experience is primarily an intentional activity between myself and the other, which does not only involve values but also affection. All experiences of love are accompanied by affection, primarily with a strong tendency to and wish for happiness. To be sure, love is not exclusively and necessarily a happy experience. Love is indeed accompanied by powerful but contradictory emotions, such as ecstasy and agony, sorrow and bliss, bitterness and sweetness, and pain and joy as well as coldness and warmth. But whatever the case is, “happiness” is somewhat implied even in an “unhappy” love. Scheler said: “Thus, even when love is ‘unhappy’ in the sense of being unrequited, the act itself is still accompanied by a feeling of great happiness—and equally so when the loved one occasions pain and sorrow.”²⁹ The reason for any suffering experienced at present for myself in my loving act to my beloved is because it was a happy one in the past. My sorrow is exactly the sorrow for the lost happy loving-lived-experience. Jules Toner calls this moment of the love experience “an affective act of affirming the loved one.”³⁰ By affirming the

²⁷ See Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love*, vol. I, *Plato to Luther*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960/1984, esp. chapter 1: “Appraisal and Bestowal.”

²⁸ “Every love is love for God, still incomplete, often slumbering of self-infatuated, often stopping, as it were, on its way.” Max Scheler, *Ordo Amoris*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

²⁹ Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

³⁰ Jules Toner, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

beloved object with affection I have created between myself and the other an affective loving relationship: whenever this other is present to myself in body, in my memory or in my anticipation, there are always emotions to accompany it. There is no love without affection. But love is more than feeling or emotion.

Aristophanes's myth in the *Symposium* offers perhaps the first explanation of the mystery of love. The reason why I love this particular person but not the other lies in the predestined union with that person. Love is the desire to re-unite with the other true side of myself, thus returning back to the original state of fullness, which is the source of ultimate happiness. There is another half of my true self waiting for me somewhere. "We are all looking for our 'other half'."³¹ Many a theme of romantic and fatal love plays on this powerful myth of uncontrollable destiny of loving partners. Yet it is phenomenologically not relevant to ask whether or not love partners are predetermined. The phenomenon of a strong tendency to be in union with the beloved other is an important moment of the loving-lived-experience. To be in union with the beloved other does not necessarily mean actual presence, bodily togetherness of myself and my beloved. The obsession in my mind with my beloved other is already a state in union. The urge to think, to see, to touch or even to dream of the other is to wish to be in union with the other. In this way my beloved other is in myself and at the same time for myself. It does not matter whether my beloved other is aware of my loving intention or not. This particular object of my love has already been integrated within my life-world. The world is thus "colored" by my love and my beloved object. Hence the objectively bad and rainy day could be seen as a romantic atmosphere for me to be with him or her. The day, so to speak, is filled with my love. Even though she or he is not physically present with me at this moment, I am possessed by the wish to be together with my beloved forever.

These three moments: valuation, affectivity and union, are disclosed through the intentional loving-lived-experience between myself and the other. It must be emphasized again that love cannot be reduced to values, affection or union. As shown in the above discussion, no virtue, happy feeling or obsession can be the cause of love. Only in my particular act of loving, indeed a voluntary, spontaneous and free act of loving intention from myself conferring to the particular object of love, can these three moments manifest. Yet this conferring act is not

³¹ Plato, *Symposium*, 191d.

necessarily a conscious act. I do not need any cognitive knowledge of my love beforehand to be aware of my loving intention. On the contrary, I know that I am *in* love only after I have an intuitive grasp of my valuation, affection and longing for togetherness with the beloved other. Julian Marias describes this “amorous condition” thus: “It (‘I am loving’) is not simply an act that I can carry out—if this were true, it would be in principle a single and isolated act, which no one would confuse with love—but I ‘find myself’ in love, I discover myself as such, I can doubt whether I am in love or not, while it would make no sense to doubt a psychic reality or even an act. We might go so far as to say that perhaps I am sure that ‘I love,’ but not sure whether I am ‘in love’.”³² The paradox or the mystery of love lies in this intuitive understanding of the certainty/uncertainty of love. Loving intention is not a logical deduction from feeling or values; i.e. I am loving this particular other not because I have found happiness and virtue in him/her/it. I am loving this other because I have an intuitive understanding of valuation, affection and the longing for togetherness disclosed in myself, to myself and for myself. Hence, loving is a unique lived-experience which cannot be further reduced to other acts.

Toward a Phenomenology of the Experience of Love

The purpose of this chapter does not purport to discern the mystery of love by analyzing the meaning and ideal of love in the rich history of love in the Western culture. Here I am not interested in good or bad, true or false love, or whether love is an illusion or an ideal. Though there is a completely different culture of love in China, I am not interested in the difference between the Chinese and Western traditions either. My contention is: before my ethics and metaphysics of love are possible, a phenomenology of love as a lived-experience must be worked out. I am interested in the common understanding of love in all kinds of its manifestations, whether it is my love to my dead mother, my wife, philosophy, photography, democracy or spicy food. I would like to elucidate the “how” of this loving-lived-experience when I utter consciously and seriously that I love my mother, my wife, etc., to myself or to the other.

³² Julian Marias, *Metaphysical Anthropology*, trans. Frances M. Lopez-Morillas, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971, p. 183.

My original plan was ambitious: I wanted to undertake a *phänomenologische Auseinandersetzung* with the Western tradition of the philosophy of love, in order to show that the Chinese conception of love/*qing* is more phenomenological in spirit. I began with a dissatisfaction with the *eros-philia-agape* schema, a very powerful Western intellectual tradition, which I think is Eurocentric and metaphysical. Even Scheler's *Ordo Amoris* with its stress on the love of the Christian God as the ultimate *telos* is still kept within the European tradition, in spite of his phenomenology of love. My criticism of this tradition concerns its normative nature: it posits an ideal of love while neglecting the phenomenon of love as the loving-lived-experience. Like Socrates's criticism against Meno that when Socrates "sought only one virtue but discovered a whole swarm of virtues,"³³ I think we have too many theories of love today. But the demand on a philosophy or explanation of love shows exactly the lack of an understanding of love. This is why Erich Fromm's *The Art of Loving*, an edification and instruction of how one should love, is still one of the popular books on love.

Instead of searching for the *eidōs* of love, I propose that a phenomenological description of the loving-lived-experience is more fundamental than a philosophical theorization of love. However, what I have sketched above is only a beginning of a thorough phenomenological investigation of the complex variations of love based on this loving-lived-experience. In spite of this preliminary nature, I would think the loving-lived-experience as the intentional-affective-valuating-intuitive act is the primordial experience for all modes of love, whether it is mutual, narcissistic, romantic, brotherly, sexual, or passionate love between myself and the other. It should also be the same for the Chinese as well as the Westerner.

But how are all these diversified modes founded in the primordial experience of love? This is clearly another task, which has to await further investigation.

³³ Plato, *Meno*, 72a.